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THE DOCTRINE OF THE SUPREMACY OF THE
SUPREME COURT
HUGH E. WILLIS*
What is meant by the doctrine of the supremacy of the Su-
preme Court? The United States Constitution, partly as a
result of the work of the framers of the Constitution in the
Constitutional Convention, partly as a result of amendments,
and partly as a result of the work of the framers of the Consti-
tution who have sat upon the United States Supreme Court,
like most state constitutions, has established the doctrines of
the sovereignty of the people, the amendability of the Constitu-
tion, the separation of governmental powers, a dual form of
government, the protection of certain historical forms of per-
sonal liberty against social control, universal citizenship and
suffrage, and the supremacy of the Supreme Court. In other
words, the sovereign people, through a constitution, have estab-
lished a framework of government based upon the doctrine of a
dual form of government and the separation of governmental
powers within each branch of the dual form of government,
have enumerated the powers therein delegated to the various
agencies of government, have prescribed the limitations imposed
upon those agencies of government so as to protect personal
liberty against social control, have provided for a change of
the Constitution itself through the process of amendment, have
fixed the political status of the citizens in whom resides the
sovereign power, and have selected the power to uphold the
Constitution and all of its doctrines. Neither the Constitution
nor any of the doctrines found in it can compel obedience to
themselves. Yet each and all of these doctrines are likely to be
violated. Hence, authority must be given to someone, or some-
one must assume the authority, to uphold the Constitution and
its doctrines, or all would cease to exist from the violations and
disobedience which would occur. What agency under the United
States constitutional scheme has the authority to uphold the
Constitution? It is the United States Supreme Court. It is a doc-
trine of United States constitutional law that it is the peculiar
function of the Supreme Court of the United States to uphold
the Constitution of the United States; and that it is supreme,
* See biographical note, p. 260.
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not only over the other branches of the federal government and
the lower federal courts, but also over the state courts and the
other branches of the state governments.1 That means that
it is the function of the Supreme Court of the United States to
define and maintain the doctrine of the sovereignty of the peo-
ple,2 the doctrine of the amendability of the Constitution,3 the
doctrine of a dual form of government,4 the doctrine of the
separation of governmental powers,5 the doctrine that certain
forms of personal liberty are protected against social control by
any branch of the government,0 the doctrine of universal citi-
zenship and suffrage, 7 and the doctrine of the supremacy of the
Supreme Court itself: and in exercising this function it has the
power to set aside an act of Congress, or of the President, if in
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; to set aside
an act of Congress, or of the President and an act of the state
legislature, or of a state governor, if in violation of the doctrine
of a dual form of government; to set aside an act of Congress,
or of the President, of a state legislature, or of the governor,
and of any other officers of government, if in violation of the
guaranties in the Constitution for the protection of personal
liberty against social control; and in the same way to set aside
acts of any of the branches of either the national or state gov-
ernments if in violation of the doctrines of the sovereignty of
the people as a whole, the amendability of the Constitution, uni-
versal citizenship and suffrage, and the supremacy of the Su-
preme Court. This is the doctrine of the supremacy of the
Supreme Court.
How did the Supreme Court obtain this theocratic overlord-
ship? The only honest answer which can be given is that the
Supreme Court usurped the power. The formal Constitution is
silent upon this subject. It did not provide any person, or body,
to uphold the Constitution. The Supreme Court itself, however,
has supplied this omission by itself assuming the authority. It
1 43 Harv. L. Rev. 343; Hendron, The Chief Justice of the United
States, 8 N. Car. L. Rev. 404.
2 United States Constitution, Preamble.
3 United States Constitution, Article V.
4 United States Constitution, Article I.
5 United States Constitution, Articles I, II, III.
6 United States Constitution, Article I, Secs. 9, 10; Art. III, Sec. 3;
Art. IV, Secs. 1, 2; Art. VI; Amendments 1-16, 18, 19.
7 Amendments, 14, 15, 19.
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was such an appropriate and natural thing for the Supreme
Court to do, the Supreme Court has exercised its authority so
wisely, and so many leaders of constitutional law have assumed
this would happen, it has been argued that the Supreme Court
is not a usurper but a grantee of this power.8 But the fact that
the formal Constitution is silent upon the subject and does not
confer this power upon the Supreme Court is decisive on the
question of whether or not the power was given to the Supreme
Court or taken by the Supreme Court.9
What is the explanation for the fact that the Supreme Court
both has come to exercise and has been permitted by the sov-
ereign people to continue to exercise this power?
1. One reason for the fact that the Supreme Court finally
took this power to itself was the colonial practice. The colonial
courts and on appeal the Privy Council of England had the
power to declare legislative acts void if in conflict with colonial
charters. The colonists consequently acquired the habit of see-
ing colonial laws occasionally declared void by the courts.
Hence, upon the adoption of state constitutions it was the nat-
ural thing for the state courts tacitly to assume the function of
interpreting the new state constitutions, and judges in the
states of New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island rendered de-
cisions declaring legislative acts unconstitutional because in vio-
lation of their constitutions, and this action was generally ac-
quiesced in, though not without some opposition. This accus-
tomed the people of the new country to the supremacy of the
judiciary over the legislative branch of government. 10
2. Another reason why the Supreme Court took to itself and
kept this power was the experience under the Articles of Con-
federation. During the Revolutionary War a real federal ap-
pellate court was established in the Court of Appeals in cases of
8 Beard, The Supreme Court--Usurper or Grantee, 27 PoL. Sc. Q. 1, 84;
Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States, 78.
9 Of course the people could have taken the power usurped by the
Supreme Court away from it at any time, and it might now be stated that
because they have not done this but have permitted the Supreme Court to
continue to exercise its power, they thereby have impliedly delegated to the
Supreme Court the power to uphold all the constitutional doctrines of the
Constitution and to be supreme over all of the other agencies of govern-
ment, both national and state.
lO Holmes v. Wallon, 4 Am. Hist. Rev. 456; Rutgers v. Waddington, 1
Thayer Cas. C. L. 63; Trevett v. Weedon, 1 Thayer Cas. C. L. 73; Potter,
Judicial Power in the United States, 27 Mich. L. Rev. 1.
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capture, and one hundred seventeen prize cases were decided by
a standing committee of Congress and by this Court of Appeals.
This practice acclimated the people of the United States to a
federal tribunal superior to state tribunals."
3. Another reason for the supremacy of the United States
Supreme Court is found in Coke's celebrated dictum that there
are certain fundamental principles of the common law which
are paramount even to an act of Parliament. This dictum of
Coke, announced in Dr. Bonham's case,12 was soon repudiated in
England, 13 but the doctrine found in Coke's dictum found fertile
soil in the United States and sprouted into such a vigorous
growth that it was applied by the United States Supreme Court
in the decision of cases coming before it;14 and it has been said
that the doctrine of the supremacy of thd Supreme Court is the
logical conclusion of Coke's doctrine of control 3f the courts over
legislation. The acceptance of this doctrine, even if for a tem-
porary period, made it practically necessary for the Supreme
Court to uphold its supremacy over all other branches of govern-
ment.15
4. Still another reason which paved the way for the Supreme
Court to establish its own supremacy was the attitude of the
leaders of the American Bar in the early history of our country.
Hamilton thought that "the want of a judiciary power" was the
crowning defect of the Confederation. 16 Madison wrote to
Washington in April, 1787, "The national supremacy ought also
to be extended, as I conceive, to the judiciary departments.' 17
Wilson in his lectures at Philadelphia took the same position.'8
In the conventions of the several states prominent leaders made
the same contention. In Massachusetts, Samuel Adams said
that if any law made by the federal government should be ex-
11 Hughes, op. cit. pps. 4-7; Potter, op. cit. p. 1, 167.
12 8 Co. Rep. l18a (1610).
13 Lee v. Bude, etc., Ry., L. R. 6 C. P. 576, 682 (1871).
'4 Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386 (1798); Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87,
135 (1810); Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch 49 (1815); Wilkinson v. Leland,
2 Pet. 627, 657; Webster v. Reid, 11 How. 437, 440 (1851); Hays v. Pacijic
Mail Stm. Co., 17 How. 596 (1854); Loan Assn. v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655,
662 (1875); Willis, Due Process of Law Under the United States Consti-
tution, 74 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 331.
15 Plucknett, Bonham's Case and Judicial Review, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 38.
13 Federalist, Vol. XI, p. 176.
17 Doc. Hist. Constitution, Vol. IV, 118.
18 Lectures, VoL I, 460.
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tended beyond the power granted by the proposed constitution it
would be adjudged by the courts to be void. 19 Ellsworth made
the same contention in Connecticut,20 and George Nicholas in
Virginia.2 1 The judiciary act of 1789 embodied the same idea
because it gave the state courts the power to pass on the validity
of acts of Congress and provided for a review by the Supreme
Court where the state court had held against their validity. 22
This attitude on the part of such representative men not only
familiarized the country but the subsequent justices of the Su-
preme Court with this method of rationalization.
5. But perhaps the chief reason for the Supreme Court's
establishing its own supremacy was the fact that it was the
appropriate and natural thing to do. It was not the natural and
appropriate thing because of a written constitution nor because
the judges are bound to take an oath to support the Constitu-
tion, as was suggested in the celebrated case of Marbury V.
Madison,23 because in other countries which have written con-
stitutions the judiciary possesses no such power and because
the other officers of both the federal and state governments have
to take the same oath ;24 nor because the Constitution, the laws
of the United States pursuant thereto and all treaties made
under its authority are the supreme law of the land, because
this affects the doctrine of a dual form of government, and it
might be reasoned that it is the function of Congress to uphold
the Constitution as much as it is the function of the Supreme
Court; but it is the natural and appropriate thing, because, first,
the limitations in the Constitution are mostly limitations upon
the executive and legislative branches of the government and
not upon the judiciary, and since a branch with such limitations
should not measure its own powers, it is appropriate for the ju-
diciary to do this; second, because the judiciary is the weakest
of the three departments, has no control over the sword or the
purse, and its members are less likely to be influenced by mo-
mentary passion; and third, because it is essentially a judicial
function to decide and to apply in a particular case what the
law is. The legislative branch of the government is bound by
the Constitution as much as the judicial. If the legislature
19 2 Elliott's Debates, 142.
20 2 Elliott's Debates, 198.
21 3 Elliott's Debates, 409.
22 Beard, The Supreme Court and the Constitution, 45.
23 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
24 Thayer, Legal Essays, 2.
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should pass a law in violation of the Constitution, as for exam-
ple, a law abolishing the privilege of a jury trial, the courts in
deciding what is the law and applying it in a particular case
have no other alternative than to apply the law found in the
Constitution rather than in the act of the legislature. 25
Because of the foregoing reasons, it was inevitable
that the doctrine of the supremacy of the Supreme Court should
be established. In the case of Van Horne's Lessee v. Dor-
rance,26 Justice Patterson at Circuit Court held a statute of
Pennsylvania invalid as impairing the obligation of a contract,
and in defending his position pointed out the difference between
United States constitutional law and English constitutional law.
In Ware v. Hylton27 the Supreme Court of the United States de-
cided that a statute of Virginia was invalid because of its re-
pugnance to the provisions of the treaty of peace with Great
Britain. In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee2S the Supreme Court de-
cided that Section 25 of the Judiciary Act was constitutional in
giving the Supreme Court the power to review the judgments of
state courts, and this power was even more firmly established
by Chief Justice Marshall in the celebrated case of Cohens v.
Virginia.2 0 In the case of Fletcher v. Peck,30 Chief Justice
Marshall finally and completely established the power of the Su-
preme Court to declare unconstitutional an act of a state legisla-
ture if in violation of the United States Constitution. In Hyl-
ton v. the United States3' the Supreme Court upheld its power
to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional if in violation of
the Constitution, and this power was not at first attacked as the
power of the Supreme Court over the agencies of the state gov-
ernments had been attacked. Later, and especially by Jeffer-
son, this power of the Supreme Court over the other branches
of the federal government was attacked, but the question was
settled for all time both so far as the legislative and so far as
the executive branches of the government were concerned by
Chief Justice Marshall in the case of Marbury v. Madison.32
25 Marbury v. Madison, supra, note 23.
262 Dall. 304 (1795).
273 Dall. 199 (1796).
28 1 Wheat. 304 (1816).
20 6 Wheat. 264 (1821).
30 6 Cranch 87 (1810)
31 3 Dall. 171 (1796).
32 Supra, note 23.
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How has the doctrine, thus established, functioned in United
States history? What has come to be the relation of the Su-
preme Court to the other branches of government? How has
the Supreme Court upheld the Constitution?
To answer the above questions would require a separate law
article on each one of the doctrines of constitutional law. The
writer has already written such articles on some of the doctrines
of constitutional law, and he hopes in the course of time to
write such articles on all the rest of the doctrines. But it would
not be appropriate to go into these doctrines so exhaustively in
an article concerned merely with the doctrine of the supremacy
of the Supreme Court. Hence, all that will be attempted in this
article will be to epitomize the work of the Supreme Court so
far as its work has had anything to do with the various doc-
trines of constitutional law. No attempt will be made to set
forth all of the principles involved in each doctrine, nor to trace
the historical development thereof.
Under the doctrine of the supremacy of the Supreme Court,
what has the Supreme Court done in upholding the doctrine of
popular sovereignty? The doctrine of popular sovereignty
would seem to be established by the formal Constitution itself.
Otherwise the language of the preamble in which it is said the
people of the United States "establish this Constitution of the
United States," the language of Articles I, II, III, and IV in
which the people delegate various powers to the different agen-
cies of government but at the same time put limitations upon
the powers of these agencies of government, and the language
of Article V in which provision is made for the amendment of
the Constitution would all be meaningless; but many United
States statesmen and philosophers, jurists, and political scien-
tists have given and are still giving different explanations. Some
have found sovereignty in the states; others in a oligarchy of
the states; others in the Federal government; and others in the
various organs of government. For this reason, it was neces-
sary for the Supreme Court to decide the question for every-
body. In doing this the Supreme Court defined sovereignty as
the power which makes the law, or social control, and estab-
lished the proposition that under the United States Constitution
sovereignty resides in the people as a whole as politically organ-
ized in a dual form of government. This doctrine was first an-
nounced by the Supreme Court in the case of Chisholm v. Geor-
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gia,33 when Chief Justice Jay presided over that tribunal; con-
tinued to be the position of the United States Supreme Court
through the time of Chief Justice Marshall ;34 through the period
after the Civil War,35 with the exception of certain dicta; and
was finally and firmly established by the United States Supreme
court in the National Prohibition Cases,36 Hawke v. Smith, 37
and Leser v. Garnett.3 8 Thus it would seem that the existence
of the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people as a whole as
one of the doctrines of constitutional law, as well as the mean-
ing and application of the doctrine, are all due to the work of
the United States Supreme Court.39
What has been the work of the United States Supreme Court
so far as concerns the doctrine of the amendability of the Con-
stitution ? A first reading of Article V of the Constitution seems
to make it clear that the formal Constitution itself established
the doctrine of the amendability of the Constitution. Yet the
Constitution left many questions unsettled. The Constitution
provides two methods for proposing amendments and two meth-
ods for adopting amendments to the Constitution; proposal of
amendments by Congress or by convention and ratification by
the the legislatures of or by conventions in the several states.
But the Supreme Court had to decide that presidential approval
and the approval of a governor were unnecessary, 40 that Con-
gress cannot control the method of ratification or the time of
ratification, 4 1 that the requirement of a referendum by a state
is illegal, 42 that ratification is a final act though rejection is
not.43 State supreme courts have discovered and probably the
United States Supreme Court would discover that there is an
extra-legal method of amending the Constitution. 44 The Con-
33 2 Dall. 419 (1793).
34 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803); Fletcher V. Peck, 6 Cranch
87 (1810); McCullough v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819).
35 Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71 (1868); White v. Hart, 13 Wall.
646 (1871).
30253 U. S. 350 (1920).
37 253 U. S. 221 (1920).
38258 U. S. 130 (1922).
39 Willis, The Doctrine of Sovereignty Under the United States Consti-
tution, 15 Va. L. Rev. 437.
40 Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 Dall. 378 (1798).
41 Dillon v. Glass, 256 U. S. 368 (1921).
42 Hawke v. Smith, supra note 37.
43 Jamison, Constitutional Conventions (4th ed.) 624, 630.
44 Wood's Appeal, 75 Pa. 59 (1874).
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stitution at the present time places only one express limitation
upon the power of amendment, that against destroying the equal
representation of the states; but it has been contended by emi-
nent counsel and other authorities that there are implied limi-
tations upon the amending power, that an amendment shall not
be a new grant of power, that it shall not be in the form of
legislation, that it shall not destroy the states or the nation,
that it shall not destroy the police power of the states, and that
it shall not modify the Bill of Rights. Those making this con-
tention sometimes base their argument upon the Tenth Amend-
ment, sometimes upon a natural law above the Constitution, and
sometimes upon a false notion of sovereignty. The Supreme
Court has held that the Fifth Article is subject to none of these
implied limitations, that an amendment may contain a new
grant of power, be in the form of legislation, destroy the states
or the nation, abolish the police power of the states, change the
Bill of Rights, and work any other change in the Constitution;
because the doctrine of amendability of the Constitution is
tied up with the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people, and
because the doctrine of amendability of the Constitution is an
absolute and independent doctrine not modified by any other
provisions in the Constitution.45 The Tenth Amendment, the
Supreme Court has held, makes no reference to Article V, and
therefore does not reserve the amending power but only reserves
the non-delegated powers. The agencies of the federal govern-
ment are limited in power, but the amending power is un-
limited except as to equality in- the United States Senate, so
that the provisions in the Bill of Rights and the later amend-
ments are subject to the Fifth Article as much as the provisions
in the original Constitution. Even the proviso as to equality
in the United States Senate could be dispensed with by first
repealing the clause or by the abolition of the Senate or by a
destruction of the states. The Supreme Court destroyed for-
ever the doctrine of a limitation on the amending power to be
found in natural law when it established the doctrine of popu-
lar sovereignty. Hence, again, it is seen that while the Su-
preme Court is not responsible for the doctrine of the amenda-
bility of the Constitution, it has established or filled in most
of the details in connection with that doctrine.46
45National Prohibition Cases, supra note 36; Leser v. Garnett, supra
note 38.
46 Orfield, The Scope of the Federal Amnending Power, 28 Mich. L.
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Whether or not the formal Constitution of the United States
established a dual form of government has been a matter of dis-
pute. A reading of Articles One, Two, and Three, and the Tenth
Amendment of the Constitution would lead to the inference that
a dual form of government was thereby created. In Article
One, there was expressly delegated to Congress the power to lay
taxes, boirow money, regulate commerce, to establish uniform
rules of naturalization, to establish uniform bankruptcy laws,
coin money, punish counterfeiting, to establish post offices and
post roads, to issue patents and copyrights, to constitute inferior
federal courts, to punish offenses against the laws of nations,
to declare wat, to raise and support armies, to provide and
maintain a navy, to make rules for the government of the land
and naval forces, to call forth the militia, to provide for the
discipline and government of the militia, to exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over the District of Columbia and to make all laws
necessary and proper for the carrying into execution of the
powers named. In Article Two the treaty power was dele-
gated to the President and Senate and other powers delegated
to the President. In Article Three various powers were dele-
gated to the Federal Courts. The Tenth Amendment provides
that all powers not delegated to the United States nor prohibited
to the states by the Constitution are reserved to the states or
to the people. But many statesmen in the early history of our
country did not accept the doctrine of a dual form of govern-
ment. Any doubt upon the subject, however, was resolved by
Chief Justice Marshall, who, in his celebrated opinions in the
cases of McCullough v. Maryland-7 and Gibbons v. Ogden,48 de-
cided that our government was a dual form of government, a
federation of nations, in which the sovereign people had dele-
gated certain powers to the federal government and that any
other powers were thereby still retained by the people or dele-
gated by them to their state governments.
After the establishment of this doctrine of a dual form of
government by John Marshall, the Supreme Court continued its
work. In the first place, in defining and applying the express
powers granted to the federal government it created most of
Rev. 550; Garrett, Amending the Federal Constitution, 7 Tenn. L. Rev. 286;
Taft, Amendment of the Federal Constitution, 16 Va. L. Rev. 647; Lee,
Abolishing the Senate by Amendment, 16 Va. L. Rev. 364.
47 McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
48 Gibbons v. Ogden, 292 U. S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1828).
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the law upon the subject. In the second place, in extending the
scope of the express powers of the federal government it en-
larged the powers of the federal government as against the
states. Thus the Supreme Court has extended the powers of the
Federal government under the interstate commerce clause until
it includes so much that it is a question whether or not the states
have any jurisdiction even over intrastate commerce so far as
concerns a number of important lines of business. 49 The treaty
power has been extended so as to permit the federal govern-
ment to control many matters affecting the internal policies of
the states where Congress would have no power to so do.50
The military power has been extended so as to make legal com-
pulsory military service 5' and to give the federal government
the power almost completely to limit freedom of speech and the
press so far as concerns the government.52 In the third place,
the Supreme Court extended the power of the federal govern-
ment as against the states through the doctrine of implied
powers. The fathers of the original Constitution thought more
in terms of the abstract political theories of their day. The
justices of the Supreme Court have thought more in the terms
of economics. As a consequence, they have given more and
more powers to the federal government at the expense of the
states. In this way there has been implied the limitations that a
state cannot tax interstate commerce 53 nor an instrumentality
of the federal government;54 and the power of the federal gov-
ernment to acquire and annex new territory,55 the power to
charter a national bank,56 and the power to issue legal tender
notes.57 The doctrine of the supremacy of the Supreme Court
still further increased the powers of the federal government as
against the states, and in exercising this power in questions in-
49 Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352 (1912); Shreveport Rate Cases,
234 U. S. 342 (1914); Commission v. Railroad, 257 U. S. 563 (1921).
50 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416 (1920); Jordan v. Tashiro, 278
U. S. 123 (1928); Todok v. Union State Bank, 50 Sup. Ct. 363 (1930).
51 Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366; but see Black, Conscrip-
tion for Foreign Service, 60 Am. L. Rev. 206.
52 Willis, Freedom of Speech and the Press, 4 Ind. L. J. 445.
53 Philadelphia, etc., Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326 (1887).
54 McCullough v. Maryland, supra note 47.
55 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244 (1901).
56 McCullough v. Maryland, supra note 47.
57Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457 (1871); Juilliard v. Greenman, 110
U. S. 421 (1884).
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volving our dual form of government the Supreme Court has
favored the federal government instead of the states, not only
in the respects heretofore referred to, but in the matter of taxa-
tion, eminent domain, and police powers. Recent amendments
to the United States Constitution are still further illustrations
of the taking away of powers from the states and delegating
them to the federal government, but these changes in our form
of government were accomplished by the sovereign people them-
selves instead of by the Supreme Court, except as the Supreme
Court has interpreted the new amendments. 58 As a result of
the work of the Supreme Court the dual character of our form
of government although formally established by Chief Justice
Marshall as one of the doctrines of our constitutional law has
undergone profound changes. It has not been entirely destroyed
but the relative balance between the Federal government and
the state governments is not now what it was at the time of the
making of the original constitution.
It has been generally assumed that the formal Constitution
impliedly established a separation of governmental powers, al-
though the distribution of governmental powers to the three
different departments of government was such as to create more
of a doctrine of confusion of powers than a doctrine of separa-
tion of powers. But whatever the doctrine of separation of
powers was at the time of the making of the original Consti-
tution, the doctrine today is what the Supreme Court has made
it, and it differs very materially from the doctrine as it was
originally formulated. Today it is even more confused than it
was at the time of the original Constitution. Each one of the
different branches of government may delegate some of its
powers to another branch. The legislature does this in the mat-
ter of local self government, the determination of conditions,
the administration of standards. The executive branch of the
government does this in delegating its powers to administrative
heads. Each one of the branches of government has encroached
upon the other. The legislative branch of the government is
performing the executive function of making appointments, re-
movals, investigating the executive, and exercising some of the
58 Willis, Our Dual Form of Government, 15 Ky. L. J. 175. However,
it should be noted that the Supreme Court has not always favored the
federal government. It has rendered at least twelve decisions which di-
rectly support the reserved powers of the state. Hughes, The Supreme
Court of the U. S., pp. 91-93.
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pardoning power; and is performing judicial functions in
granting divorces, regulating legal procedure, the admission of
attorneys to practice, the disbarment of attorneys, punishment
for contempt, and impeachment. The judicial branch of the
government is performing executive functions in making ap-
pointments, removals, mandamusing lower executive officers,
suspending sentence, and setting aside pardons; and is per-
forming legislative functions in enacting judicial legislation,
setting aside treaties, and determining the happening of condi-
tions. The executive branch of the government is performing
judicial functions in fixing the term of imprisonment, pardoning
for contempt of court, and adopting judicial procedure for the
conduct of proceedings of boards and commissions; and is per-
forming legislative functions in making treaties, deciding po-
litical questions, exercising the veto, governing new territory
prior to Congressional action, fixing the rates of railroads and
waging war. Yet we know now more about what the law upon
the subject is than we have ever known before. It consequently
may be said that so far as there is a true separation of powers
and so far as the different branches of government are exercis-
ing powers which appropriately belong to other branches of the
government and so far as the doctrines of separation of gov-
ernmental powers has been a success, it is all due to the United
States Supreme Court.59
One of the largest and the most important doctrines estab-
lished by the original Constitution was the doctrine that certain
forms of personal liberty should be protected against social
control. The constitutional line between personal liberty and
social control is drawn in the Constitution in the following
places: Article I, Sections 9 and 10; Article III, Section 3; Ar-
ticle IV, Sections 1 and 2; Article VI; and in all of the amend-
ments except the seventeenth. This would seem to be enough to
settle forever the boundaries of personal liberty and the bound-
aries of social control. But a student of constitiqtional law
knows that this is not the case. By its interpretation of the
constitutional guaranties of rights, powers, privileges and im-
munities to individuals, the Supreme Court has either narrowed
or enlarged the protection afforded by the Constitution. It has
generally narrowed the protection. Thus the guaranty of free-
dom of speech and the press has been narrowed so that it pro-
59 Willis, The Doctrine of the Separation of Governmental Powers (to
be published this year).
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tects against very little besides censorship. o30 The guaranty of
religious freedom has been interpreted to give no protection
against unsocial acts.61 The guaranty against self-crimination
has been held to afford no protection against third degree
work.03 The guaranty against unreasonable searches and seiz-
ures does not protect a person against search without a war-
rant after he has been legally arrested, nor the search of a
place without a warrant where an arrest has been made, nor
the search of an automobile without a warrant if it is on rea-
sonable suspicion. But the courts have held that evidence ille-
gally obtained by an unreasonable search is not legally admiss-
able.63 The guaranty against slavery and involuntary servi-
tude has been held not to prevent imprisonment for contempt or 64
fraudulently jumping a board bill,65 compulsory work on the
highways,66 imprisonment of a sailor on ship board, 67 nor com-
pulsory military training.68 The guaranty against impairing
the obligation of a contract has been interpreted to be subject
to the power of eminent domain 69 and the police power.70 Fin-
ally the Supreme Court has extended the scope of the due pro-
cess clause to matters of substance as well as procedure and
thereby has made it cover not only its own ground but prac-
tically all the ground of the other guaranties; and, under this
widened scope of the due process clause, has practically arro-
gated to itself the function of drawing the line between per-
sonal liberty and social control, because it has taken the position
that whether or not any social control is due process of law de-
pends upon whether or not it is reasonable, and whether or not
it is reasonable depends upon the decision of the justices of the
60 Gitlow v. People of New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925); Willis, Freedom
of Speech and the Press, 4 Ind. L. Jour. 445.
61 Reynolds v. the United States, 98 U. S. 145 (1878).
62 Irvine, The Third Degree and the Privilege Against Self-Crimina-
tion, 13 Cornell L. Q. 211.
63 Willis, Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 4 Ind. L. Jour. 311.
64 Martin v. Blattner, 68 Iowa 286 (1885).
65 In re Dassler, 35 Kans. 678 (1886) ; Clark v. State of Indiana, 171
Ind 104 (1908).
66 Butler v. Perry, 240 U. S. 328 (1916).
67 Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275 (1897).
6s Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366 (1918).
69 Long Island Water Supply Company v. Brooklyn, 166 U. S. 685
(1897).
7 0 Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814 (1879; Illinois Central Railway
Company v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 387 (1892).
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Supreme Court.7 1 In drawing the line between personal lib-
erty and social control under this last power the Supreme Court
has seemed to favor personal liberty more than social control.
Thus, it has held that a state cannot pass an eight-hour day
law for men ;72 that a state cannot require the English language
in schools ;73 that a state cannot abolish the remedy of injunction
in labor disputes;74 that a business cannot be made a public
calling by legislative declaration;75 that a state's powers over
foreign corporations is limited ;76 that Congress cannot pass a
minimum wage law;77 and that Congress cannot pass a child
labor law.7 8 What we have said sufficiently shows that the doc-
trine that personal liberty of many kinds should be protected
against social control has been almost entirely made over by
the Supreme Court, and is now just what the Supreme Court
has made it.
The doctrine of universal citizenship and suffrage was so
thoroughly established as a doctrine of United States constitu-
tional law by the 14th, 15th and 19th amendments that it would
seem very little was left for the Supreme Court to do towards
the development of this doctrine. Yet it was not until the de-
cision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of United
States v. Wong Kim Ark79 that it was known that the basis of
citizenship in the United States was the English rule of birth
within the allegiance rather than the Roman law rule that the
citizenship of the child followed that of the parent; and that it
included the citizenship of free negroes ;80 and it was not until
the case of Weedin v. Chin Bows that it was known a child
born out of the United States of citizens who had never resided
71 Willis, Due Process of Law Under the United States Constitution,
74 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 331.
72 Lockner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905) ; Bunting v. Oregon, 243
U. S. 426 (1917).
73 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923).
74 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312 (1921).
75 Frost Trucking Co. v. R. R. Commission of Cal., 271 U. S. 583 (1926).
76 Kentucky Finance Corp. v. Paramount Auto Corp., 262 U. S. 544
(1923).
77 Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 (1923).
7 8 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (1918) ; Bailey v. Drexel Furn.
Co., 259 U. S. 20 (1922).
79 169 U. S. 649 (1898).
50 The effect of this holding was to overrule the decision in the case of
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857).
81 274 U. S. 657 (1927); 6 Tex. L. Rev. 218.
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in the United States was not a citizen; and it was not until the
case of In re Lai Mow82 that it was known a child born of for-
eign parents on a United States steamship was not a United
States citizen. While the 14th Amendment did not make suf-
frage a privilege of United States citizenship, of course the
15th and 19th Amendments gave the colored people and women
an immunity against the denial of their privilege of voting on
account of race or sex. Yet the Supreme Court has held that
these provisions of the Constitution do not prohibit educational
and other qualifications for voting, provided they are not dis-
criminatory,8 3 nor the disfranchisement of a class by political
parties.8 4 At first the Supreme Court held that the United
States had no jurisdiction over primary elections,88 but later
the Supreme Court reversed itself on this point.8 6 While citi-
zenship by naturalization seems to be a power given to Con-
gress, yet it remained for the United States Supreme Court to
decide that a pacifist could not enter the door of citizenship
through naturalization. 87
Finally, of course, the Supreme Court has performed an im-
portant function in connection with the doctrine of its own su-
premacy. This is a doctrine entirely originated and created
by the Supreme Court, and in upholding and applying this doc-
trine the Supreme Court has done all of the things with refer-
ence to the other doctrines of constitutional law which have
been heretofore set forth, and has established its supremacy
over the other departments of the federal government and all
the departments of the state governments. In exercising this
supra authority the Supreme Court does not, except sometimes
in applying the due process clause to matters of substance and
very indirectly in connection with other clauses of the Consti-
tution, defeat the real will of the people, because when legisla-
tion is held void it is because it is indirectly forbidden by the
Constitution which expresses the will of the people perhaps
even more than does a legislative act.88
82 19 Fed. (2nd) 951 (1927); 28 Col. L. Rev. 499.
83 Popo 'v. Williams, 193 U. S. 621 (1904); Guinn v. United States, 238
U. S. 347 (1915).
84 Grigsby v. Harris, 27 Fed. 942; 16 Va. L. Rev. 193.
85 Newberry v. United States, 256 U. S. 232 (1921).
80 Barry v. United States, 279 U. S. 597 (1929).
87 United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U. S. 644 (1929); 16 Va. L. Rev.
169; 3 Cin. L. Jour. 462; 28 Mich. L. Rev. 445.
88 Lindsay v. Commissioners, 2 Ray. 38, 61; 1 Willoughby, Constitution
of the United States, 9.
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A judicial declaration of the unconstitutionality of a statute
does not annul or repeal the statute but has the effect of ignor-
ing or disregarding it so far as the determination of the rights
of private parties is concerned.8 9 The courts generally say that
the effect of an unconstitutional statute is nothing. It is as
though it had never been passed. 90 Yet this statement needs
many qualifications. There are some situations where the
courts are in substantial agreement that an unconstitutional
statute is void ab initio. These are cases of repealing a statute
and unconstitutional amendments to a statute, criminal convic-
tion under an unconstitutional statute which is later reversed,
judgment in a civil suit rendered under an unconstitutional
statute, or by a court established by an unconstitutional statute
(except as limited by the de facto officer doctrine), the incor-
poration or disincorporation of a city (except as affected by the
de facto doctrine), the payment of taxes under an unconstitu-
tional statute (except as modified by the voluntary payment
doctrine), the stripping doctrine under the 11th Amendment,
and individual criminal liability for acts committed under un-
constitutional statutes. There is a second class of situations
in which the courts are in conflict as to whether the rule should
be the rule of void ab initio, or the rule of void from date of
declaration of unconstitutionality. These are cases of creation
of moral obligations on the part of the government, creation of
a public office, the civil liability of officers for acts done under
unconstitutional statutes, the defense of an officer to an action
of mandamus brought to compel him to act under an unconsti-
tutional statute, the curing of the defect of unconstitutionality
by statutory amendment, and the curing of the defects of un-
constitutionality by change in the Constitution. There is a
third class of situations where the courts generally refuse to
apply the void ab initio rule but instead apply the rule of void
from the time of declaration. These are cases of criminal lia-
bility of an officer who has acted under an unconstitutional
statute, the reversal of a decision of unconstitutionality, the re-
versal of a decision of constitutionality where rights have been
acquired in reliance on the first decision, and a criminal con-
s9 Shephard v. Wheeling, 30 W. Va. 479 (1887).
90 "An unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no rights, it imposes
no duties, it affords no protection, it creates no office; it is, in legal con-
templation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed." Norton V.
Shelby County, 118 U. S. 425 (1886).
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viction under an unconstitutional statute, double jeopardy, and
the commitment of an insane person. 91 An unconstitutional
statute may not be void at all but only inapplicable to a par-
ticular situation while applicable to other situations, and a part
of an act may be unconstitutional and the rest of the act con-
stitutional.92
The supremacy of the Supreme Court is also shown in its
exercise of the power to punish for contempt of court; in its
making of a true federal common law in cases of diversity of
citizenship and in suits between different states as well as un-
der the due process clause and the obligation of contracts
clause;U3 in its supervision of the work of the lower federal
courts; in the admission and disbarment of attorneys, And the
development of a real federal police power in connection with
the interstate commerce clause, suits involving diversity of citi-
zenship and administrative activities of the federal govern-
ment.9 4
What has been the nature of the judicial process of the United
States Supreme Court on constitutional questions? Has it been
analytical, historical or philosophical? A study of the decisions
of the United States. Supreme Court shows an overwhelming
amount of conflict. The justices of the Supreme Bench have not
adhered to precedents on the rule of stare decisis, but have
treated precedents as mere hypothetical conclusions to be aban-
doned whenever proven false by the test of experience. In ex-
ercizing its functions, the Supreme Court has sometimes been
influenced by historical considerations, at other times by ana-
lytical considerations, and at other times by philosophical con-
siderations. Sometimes one consideration and sometimes the
other has predominated. Sometimes a change in the position
of the United States Supreme Court has been due to a change in
the views of the justices, sometimes to a change in social con-
ditions, but more frequently to a change in the personnel of the
Bench. 95 Such conflicting decisions and reversals of positions
as are found in the original package cases,9 6 the legal tender
91 Field, Effect of an Unconstitutional Statute, 1 Ind. L. Jour. 1.
92 Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 158 U. S. 601
(1895).
03 Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46 (1907).
94 Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States, 154.
Or Willis, Some Conflicting Decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, 13 Va. L. Rev. 155, 278.
96 License Cases, 5 How. 504 (1847); Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100
(1890); Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461 (1894).
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cases,97 the hours of labor decisions,98 interpretations of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 99 and the insular cases' 00 can be ex-
plained only on the theory of a change in the personnel of the
bench, although different justices have been influenced by dif-
ferent considerations,-now philosophical, now historical, and
now analytical. 10 In the gradual modification of the doctrine
of the Dartmouth College Case, in the development of the doc-
trine of a dual form of government, in the change in the frame-
work of our government in the direction of centralization, and
in the development of the doctrines of freedom of speech, un-
reasonable searches and seizures, waiver of jury trial, and privi-
leges and immunities of citizens of the state and citizens of the
United States, the justices have generally emphasized the philo-
sophical process. In the development of the privilege of jury
trial, the immunity against slavery and the right of citizenship,
the justices have emphasized the historical process. In many of
the decisions developing the law as to what is intra-state and
what is inter-state commerce, the original package decisions
and the rate of return, as well as the rate base, for the regula-
tion of public callings, the justices have emphasized the ana-
lytical process.10 2
What has been said with reference to the work of the United
States Supreme Court is true also with reference to the work of
the supreme courts of the various states. State constitutions
are as silent as is the United States Constitution upon the sub-
ject of what branch of government shall be supreme, but the
highest courts of the states have settled the question in favor
of their own supremacy as to state governments, as the United
States Supreme Court has as to the federal government. Yet,
97 Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603 (1870); Legal Tender Cases, 12
Wall. 457 (1871); Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U. S. 421 (1884).
98Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366 (1896); Lochner v. New York, 198
U. S. 45 (1905); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412 (1908); Bunting v. Ore-
gon, 243 U. S. 426 (1917).
99 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assoc., 166 U. S. 290
(1897) ; United States v. Joint Traffic Assoc., 171 U. S. 505 (1898) ; Stand-
ard Oil Company v. United States, 221 U. S. 106 (1911); United States v.
United States Steel Corporation, 251 U. S. 417 (1920).
loo De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1 (1909); Downes v. Bidwell, 182
U. S. 244 (1900).
lol Willis, Some Conflicting Decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, supra note 95.
102 Willis, ibid., note 95.
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of course, as between state courts and the United States Su-
preme Court the latter has made the former subject to the
greater general supremacy of the United States Supreme Court.
Enough has been said to show that the real Constitution of
the United States is the work of the United States Supreme
Court. The original written Constitution contains what is usu-
ally thought of as the United States Constitution; but in addi-
tion to this there probably is an unwritten constitution, in-
cluding the cabinet system, a rule against the third term for
the president, and other like matters: and there is a real con-
stitution found in the three hundred volumes of officially re-
ported decisions of the United States Supreme Court. The
original Constitution created only the foundation of our con-
stitutional law. The Supreme Court has built the super-struc-
ture. The original Constitution, to use another figure, was a
somewhat meager blue-print; the present constitution, a com-
pleted blue-print and plans and specifications. The original
drafters of our Constitution worked out some of the framework
of our federal government, the powers delegated to the various
agencies of government, the limitations upon the exercise of
such powers, and the amendability of the Constitution; but this
work is trifling in comparison with the work of the Supreme
Court. For example, the framers of the Constitution only im-
pliedly established the doctrine of popular sovereignty, if at all.
The Supreme Court not only finally settled this question, but
established all of the principles involved in the doctrine. The
fathers established the doctrine of amendability of the Consti-
tution, but left most of the problems in connection therewith for
the final decision of the Supreme Court. The fathers apparently
worked on the theory that they were establishing a dual form of
government, but the doctrine was really written into our Con-
stitution by the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court has
done most of the work of delimiting the powers, both of the
states and of the federal government; and has on many occa-
sions actually changed the line between the spheres of the states
and the sphere of the federal government. The fathers worked
out a hybrid doctrine of separation of powers, but the Supreme
Court has taken hold of this doctrine and very largely recasted
it. The fathers somewhat elaborately worked out a doctrine of
the protection of personal liberty against social control, but
the Supreme Court has seized hold of this doctrine and made it
over so that it is an entirely new doctrine. The sons of the
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fathers established a doctrine of universal citizenship and suff-
rage, but even this had to be interpreted and amplified by the
Supreme Court. The doctrine of the supremacy of the Supreme
Court was one entirely omitted by the fathers and is the sole
work of the Supreme Court. Hence, the conclusion is forced
upon us that the United States Constitution is the result of the
"judicial carpentry" of the few quiet men who throughout the
course of our history have sat upon the Supreme Bench. They
are the ones who have made the supernal 'postulates and the
immortal discoveries found in United States constitutional law.
The United States Constitution is their unique handiwork.
In thus making the Constitution the justices have not always
been consistent, nor always followed the doctrines of their pre-
decessors. Overruled cases and present conflicting decisions
of the Supreme Court abound. The doctrine of the Dartmouth
College Case0 3 that a charter of a corporation was a contract
inviolate against the police power, 04 the power of taxation,10 5
and possibly even the power of eminent domain has gradually
been modified so as to make it subject to the power of eminent
domain 0 6 and all forms of police power' 0" except one. 05 The
kind of a dual form of government found in the decisions of
John Marshall is not the kind of a dual form of government
found in the recent decisions of the Supreme Court. For ex-
ample, where once the Court made the powers of the states and
the nation concurrent 09 under the interstate commerce clause
it now makes the power of the nation exclusive" 0 and gives to
the states only an incidental police power.", An income tax
was at first held by the Court not to be a direct tax 1 2 but it was
later held by the Court to be a direct tax.113 At first the Court
1034 Wheat. 518 (1819).
104 Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co., 1 Wall. 116 (1864).
105 Piqua Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. 369 (1853).
106 Long Island Water Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U. S. 685 (1897).
107 Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814 (1879); Illinois Central R. Co. v.
Illinois, 146 U. S. 387 (1892).
108 Columbus, etc., Co. v. Columbus, 249 U. S. 399 (1919).
109 Wilson v. Black Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245 (1829).
110 Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens, 12 How. 299 (1851).
111 Lake Shore, etc. By. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285 (1899).
112 Springer v. United States, 102 U. S. 586 (1880)
113 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429, 158 U. S.
601 (1895).
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held that taxation could be for the purpose of regulation," 4
but recently it has held to the contrary." 5 When the constitu-
tionality of legal tender notes first came before the Court it
held them unconstitutional,"" but it later reversed itself." 7
The protection of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment was at first confined by the Court to legal pro-
cedure" s and negroes" 9 but little by little this doctrine was
changed until the protection was extended to matters of sub-
stance, 20 white people, 120 and the property rights of corpora-
tions.121 Even when thus extended the decisions under the due
process clause did not remain unchanged. It is enough for pur-
poses of illustration to refer to the fact that the regulation of
hours of labor, which at one time was illegal1 22 is now perfectly
legal.123. Such decisions as Wilson v. New 124 and Wolff v. Court
of Industrial Relations125 on the subject of continuity of service;
Plessy v. Ferguson,126 L'Hote v. New Orleans 27 and Buchanan
v. Warley12 8 on segregation; Schenck v. United States'2 9 and
Gilbert v. Minnesota'30 on sedition; and decisions giving a strict
construction to guaranties of jury trial, 13 1 searches and seiz-
ures, 132 and elections 13 3 and decisions giving a liberal construc-
114 Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 (1869) ; Head Money Cases, 112
U. S. 580 (1884); MeCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27 (1904).
115 Bailey v. Drexel Furn. Co., 259 U. S. 20 (1922).
110 Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603 (1870).
117 Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457 (1871); Juilliard v. Greenman,
110 U. S. 421 (1884).
118 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876).
119 Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (1873).
120 Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97 (1878).
121 Covington etc. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578 (1896).
122 Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905).
123 Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426 (1917).
124243 U. S. 332 (1917).
125 262 U. S. 522 (1923).
120163 U. S. 537 (1896).
127177 U. S. 587 (1900).
128245 U. S. 60 (1917).
129 249 U. S. 47 (1919).
130254 U. S. 325 (1920).
131 Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343 (1898).
132 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 (1928).
13 3 Newberry v. United States, 256 U. S. 232 (1921). But cf. Nixon V.
Herndon, 273 U. S. 536 (1927) and Barry v. United States, 279 U. S. 597
(1929).
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tion to due process134 and the implied powers 35 of the federal
government cannot be harmonized.
Yet, through all this welter of conflicting, reversed and in-
harmonious decisions the Supreme Court has been making the
Constitution of the United States. Yes, the making of the
United States Constitution has become the peculiar pre-
rogative of the Supreme Court, and it has been truly
said that (so far as concerns the agents of government)
"the real rulers of this country are the justices of the
United States Supreme Court." This does not mean that
our Constitution is not what it ought to be. Looking
at the entire period of our constitutional history, the Supreme
Court has functioned well. Its handiwork is a noble piece of
work. In spite of the fact that the personnel of the Bench has
influenced specific decisions and there have been opposing views
between men of such different schools of thought as Federal-
ists and Localists, as believers in property and believers in per-
sonal rights, and as Conservatives and Progressives, yet
throughout its entire history no particular faction has con-
trolled the Bench, and throughout the history of the Constitu-
tion it has been characterized by growth and development more
than change. So far as there has been a trend towards cen-
tralization it has on the whole only kept pace with the develop-
ment of national social interests and the development of busi-
ness national in scope. So far as there has been a trend toward
socialization it has only been in line with what has been occur-
ring in the social life of the Anglo-American world. On the
whole, our Constitution has been a progressive document. It
can be likened to a living, growing organism, or to a modern
skyscraper arising on the site of a modest ancient building. The
work of the United States Supreme Court has been a success.
Speaking generally, those doctrines of constitutional law which
it has made ought to have been made and those doctrines of con-
stitutional law which it has changed and modified ought to
have been changed and modified. 136
The result is that the Court has both been respected' 37 and
134 Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 (1884).
135 McCullough v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819) ; Downes v. Bidwell,
182 U. S. 244 (1901); Selective Draft'Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366 (1918).
136 Willis, op. cit. note 95; Albertsworth, The Federal Supreme Court
and the Superstructure of the Constitution, 16 A. B. A. 565; notes 96-100.
137 Warren, Congress, the Constitution and the Supreme Court; Haines,
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its business has grown. In the year of Marshall's appointment
only ten cases were brought before the Court. During the next
five years only 120 cases were brought before the Court. Be-
tween 1826 and 1830 the number of cases rose to an annual av-
erage of fifty-eight. By 1850 the average was seventy-one. In
1860 it had reached 278. In 1880 the number of cases set for
argument had reached 1069. The establishment of the Circuit
Court of Appeals under the act of 1891 and the judiciary act
of 1925 relieved the Supreme Court of most of its work except on
constitutional questions, so that in 1926 there were only 667
cases on the docket, and the court is now able to keep fairly
abreast of its work. Whereas in 1923 the source of 136 cases
decided by the United States Supreme Court was the lower fed-
eral courts; in 1929 the lower federal courts were the source of
only seventy-seven. In 1924 the due process clause competed on
fairly even terms with the interstate commerce clause for the
attention of the United States Supreme Court, but in 1929 the
due process clause had no competitor. Since 1923 the Supreme
Court has declared six acts of Congress unconstitutional, fifty
seven state statutes unconstitutional, and seventeen orders of
state commissions or officers, besides nine state statutes because
in conflict with acts of Congress, two orders of state commis-
sions because conflicting with acts of Congress and two terri-
torial acts because conflicting with acts of Congress. Since
1923 the Supreme Court has rendered 1131 unanimous deci-
sions; fifty eight-to-one decisions; thirty-nine seven-to-two de-
cisions; forty-seven six-to-three; and fourteen five-to-four; with
one four-to-four opinion.138
So great has grown the respect for the United States Su-
preme Court in the United States, and perhaps in the world,
that it is now regarded as the most outstanding achievement in
our form of government. At different times different members
of the Bench and different decisions of the Court have been sub-
ject to criticism. In the early history of the country Jefferson
and others with his political viewpoint criticised the Court for
its establishment of the doctrine of its own supremacy. In
The American Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy; Carson, History of the
Supreme Court; Beveridge, Life of Marshall; Hughes, The Supreme Court
of the United States.
138 Hughes, op. cit. p. 55; Frankfurter and Landis, The Business of the
Supreme Court; Unpublished statistics compiled by Professor J. P. Rich-
ardson of Dartmouth College.
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more recent times Roosevelt and La Follette criticized the Court
for its position on matters of police power under the doctrine
of the protection of personal liberty against social control. Yet
when the entire period of the Court's activities; the thousands
of its determinations, the difficulty of the questions with which
it has dealt, the way with which it has come out of its conflicts,
and its general ability are taken into consideration, there is no
institution of government which today stands higher in public
confidence. It is probably regarded as the crowning marvel of
the wonders wrought by American statesmanship and the great-
est conception of the Constitution. While its proto-type existed
in the superior courts of the states, it is American in concep-
tion and function, and its majestic proportions have been car-
ried to a height which is almost sublime. The people of the
United States believe that no product of government here or
elsewhere has ever approached it in grandeur. In spite of the
fact that it is absolute in authority; that from its mandates
there is no appeal; that its decree is law; that it possesses
higher prerogatives than any other court, ancient or modern,
ever possessed; that its jurisdiction extends over powerful
states as well as over the humblest individual; that it is armed
with a right and power to annul the statutes of states, and to
restrict congressional action within constitutional bounds; and
that it is secure in a life tenure, yet the American people are
not afraid of its power nor jealous of its prerogatives, but in-
stead look to it as a guardian and protector, and respect the
justices of the Supreme Court as the ministers of the Consti-
tution and the high priests of the law. The United States Su-
preme Court has come to inspire both awe and veneration. 13 9
What are the reasons for this respect of the Supreme Court
and for its success in reading the doctrine of the supremacy of
the Supreme Court into our constitutional law?
1. One reason is the independence, integrity and ability
which has characterized the Supreme Court throughout its his-
tory. Justices appointed by Jefferson and Madison joined with
Marshall in developing a strong nationalistic interpretation of
the Constitution, obnoxious to them. Judges appointed by
Jackson joined with Marshall and Story in supporting the
Cherokee commissioners against Georgia, in flat opposition to
139 Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States, 55; Carson, His-
tory of the Supreme Court, 6.
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Jackson. And the whole Bench appointed by Jackson decided
against his policy in relation to the Spanish land claims. Jus-
tices appointed by Jackson and Van Buren threw down the
gauntlet to the former by issuing a mandamus against his post-
master general. In cases of slavery, anti-slavery justices joined
with pro-slavery justices. The obnoxious fugitive slave law
was unanimously upheld by anti-slavery Whigs and pro-slavery
Democrats. A northern Democrat joined with a northern Whig
in the dissent in the Dred Scott case. Lincoln's legal tender
policy was held unconstitutional by his own appointees. Repub-
lican reconstruction policies were held unconstitutional by a
Republican bench. A Democratic chief justice joined with Re-
publican associates to establish constitutional views opposed by
the Democratic party with reference to our insular possessions.
Justice Holmes, an appointee of President Roosevelt, dissented
in the Northern Securities Case, a case in which President
Roosevelt was deeply interested. In the postmaster removal
case of President Wilson, associate justices appointed by him
dissented but a Republican chief justice upheld his power. From
the time of John Jay, of whom it has been said that "when the
judicial ermine touched his shoulders it touched nothing not as
white as itself" to the present venerable open-minded Justice
Holmes, not a breath of scandal or corruption has ever touched
any justice of the United States Supreme Court. Marshall's
pre-eminent intellectual ability is everywhere recognized, but
there have been other great chief-justices and associate jus-
tics. Everyone of the chief-justices has been a lawyer of first
rate ability. The associate justices of unusual ability were
Story, Miller, and Field, and the great Justice Holmes recalls
us to the traditions of Marshall. 140
2. Another reason is the fact that the Supreme Court has
created or modified or upheld those other, doctrines of constitu-
tional law which the exigencies of our federal government re-
quire. This is especially true insofar as the Supreme Court has
refrained from extending its own powers at the expense of the
doctrine of the separation of powers and the subversion of the
sovereignty of the people. The Supreme Court has maintained
the doctrine of separation of powers so far as it concerns itself
by refusing to mandamus Congress and state legislature and
140 Hughes, op. cit. 47, 58; Willis, Introduction to Anglo-American Law,
165-174.
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the President and governors. 141 The courts also have upheld
the doctrine of separation of powers by refusing to decide po-
litical questions, like reapportionment and a Republican form
of government, and by leaving them to the executive and legis-
lative branches of the government.142  The Supreme Court
likewise has upheld the doctrine of separation of powers as
against itself in declining to set aside acts of state legislatures,
except when the unconstitutionality is clear. It has refused to
decide questions of constitutionality unless necessarily pre-
sented.143 It has also tried not to review questions of legisla-
tive policy and to inquire into the motives of Congress. 144 Ex-
cept in cases involving the due process clause as to matters of
substance the Supreme Court has generally succeeded in ob-
serving this voluntary limitation on itself, but where the Su-
preme Court by a five to fonr vote has declared all sorts of eco-
nomic and social legislation unconstitutional because in viola-
tion of the due process clause, it would seem that it had only
given lip service to the rule, and that if the Supreme Court was
really going to live up to it, it should impose another voluntary
limitation on itself not to declare such legislation unconstitu-
tional except by at least a seven to two vote. The Supreme
Court has observed the sovereignty of the sovereign people by
recognizing a new revolutionary constitution and by upholding
the power of the people to amend the Constitution in the man-
ner attempted in the recent amendments to the Constitution.
The doctrines of a dual form of government, the protection of
personal liberty against social control, the amendability of the
Constitution, and universal citizenship and suffrage have also
been interpreted and enlarged or modified so as to give the
Constitution elasticity and make it adaptable to new times and
conditions and a new social order. Very few amendments to
the Constitution have been adopted or could be adopted but the
Supreme Court has by its work done what could never have
been done by the process of amendment. It has saved the Con-
141 State of Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. 475 (1867); Turnbull v.
Giddings, 95 Mich. 314 (1893).
142 Luther -v. Borden, 7 How, 1 (1849); Pa. Stp. Tel. and Tel. Co. v.
Oregon, 223 U. S. 118 (1912); 42 Harv. L. Rev. 1015; 34 Dickinson L.
Rev. 193.
143 United States v. Delaware and Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366 (1909).
144 Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries and Ware House Co., 251 U. S.
146 (1919).
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stitution and made it a document for all time instead of the time
of the thirteen colonies.
3. Another reason is the fact that the federal courts have
been given judicial power only over "cases" and "controversies."
This is not a limitation put upon the Supreme and other federal
courts by the Supreme Court itself, but a limitation which has
been put upon them by the Constitution. 145 This means that
the courts will not declare laws unconstitutional in moot cases,
or in the case of advisory opinions, 140 but only in the course of
actual litigation. Probably a "controversy" would have to be
civil in nature. A "case" would have to be some suit instituted
according to the regular course of legal procedure. It is there-
fore the privilege of any litigant, that is, any legal entity, to
institute such a case or controversy, but in order to do so such
person must show that his own substantial interests will be or
have been adversely affected. 14" Tax-payers are held to have
such interest where any law affecting them would involve taxa-
tion.148 As to whether a public official charged with the execu-
tion of a law or administrative officials in actions to enforce the
performance of statutory ministerial duties can question the
constitutionality of a law by refusing to act, is a matter on
which the decisions are in conflict. 49
Do the federal, as well as the state courts, have the power
constitutionally to make declaratory judgments? Apparently
the United States Supreme Court has decided that the federal
courts have not been given this judicial power.Y o But most of
the state courts have decided that declaratory judgments are
a part of the judicial power of the courts. A declaratory judg-
ment is clearly not an advisory opinion or an opinion on a moot
question. But is it a case or controversy? It would seem that
145 3 1ushrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346 (1911); Fidelity etc. Co.
v. Swope, 274 U. S. 123 (1927).
146 Williams v. Riley, 50 S. Ct. 63 (1929). The constitutions of some
states require the courts to give advisory opinions: Green v. Common-
wealth, 12 Allen 155; 13 Ia. L. Rev. 188.
147 Yazoo and Mississippi V. R. Co. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U. S.
217 (1912).
148 Frothinghat v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923).
149 Willoughby, Constitution of the United States, See. 12; 42 Harv. L.
Rev. 1071.
Izo Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U. S. 70 (1927); New York
etc. v. Illinois, 274 U. S. 488 (1927); Willing v. Chicago Aud. Ass'n., 277
U. S. 274 (1928); Piedmont etc. Co. v. United States, 50 S. Ct. 192 (1930).
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the words "cases" and "controversies" do not narrow the juris-
diction of the federal courts to anything less than the jurisdic-
tion of the state courts; and that if a declaratory judgment is
constitutional under state constitutions, because an exercise of
the judicial power, they should be constitutional under the
United States Constitution, because cases or controversies. If
such is the correct view, is the weight of authority among the
state decisions or the position of the United States Supreme
Court correct? The judicial power is the power to make de-
cisions in actual cases involving the rights, powers, privileges
and immunities, or the duties and other liabilities of litigating
parties. The actual invasion of legal capacities or violations of
legal duties is not necessary, nor is an execution required. This
is proven by the fact that the federal courts as well as the state
courts entertain suits to quiet title, to remove a cloud on title,
for the construction of wills, for the construction of the Tor-
rens' Act, for the determination of heirs, -as to the validity of
bonds, as to the validity of marriage, to enjoin the payment of
an invalid tax, and in the case of appeals by the state in criminal
cases. All of these suits are declaratory judgments, as much as
those which are strictly so-called. A declaratory judgment is
simply an extension to new cases of a principle well established
in the law. By refusing to exercise this power, the United
States Supreme Court evidently thinks that it is both upholding
the doctrine of separation of powers and applying a constitu-
tional limitation which will tend to bring the Court into respect.
But it is submitted that the Court is mistaken on both of these
points.151
4. Another reason is the method according to which the Court
performs its work. Oral arguments are encouraged. The So-
cratic method is applied. Every matter is considered. Cases
are discussed and decided before they are assigned by the Chief
Justice for opinion-writing. Draft opinions in print are dis-
tributed for consideration by the individual justices in advance
of subsequent conferences. Rehearings are discouraged.152 In
coming to their decisions and in writing their opinions, the jus-
151 19 Mich. L. Rev. 79, 86; 25 Mich. L. Rev. 669; 41 Harv. L. Rev.
232, 257; 3 Ind. L. Jour. 351, 358; 14 A. B. A. 633; 23 Il1. L. Rev. 595;
3 Cin. L. Rev. 24; 28 Yale L. Jour. 1; 30 Yale L. Jour. 163; 36 Yale L.
Jour. 845.
152 Willoughby, op. cit. 42-75; Frankfurter and Landis, op. cit. VII;
Hughes, op. cit. 57-63.
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tices of the Supreme Court apply as principles of constitutional
construction a presumption in favor of the constitutionality,
both of an act of Congress and of an act of a state legislature;
give force to contemporaneous or long-continued legislative in-
terpretation; resort to extrinsic evidence as to the meaning of
ambiguities or words which require definition, like the debates
in the Constitutional Convention and legislature, reports of
committees, the "Federalist," and the history of the times; and
construe the Constitution as a whole.
5. Still another reason is the long tenure of the judges.
Marshall presided as Chief Justice thirty-four years. Story sat
as an associate justice thirty-four years. The present Associate
Justice Holmes has already served twenty-eight years. The
result of this long judicial tenure has been a tendency toward
continuity and coordinated consistency in the development of
the principles of constitutional law.
6. A final reason that will be given is the help and support of
the Bar. The United States Supreme Court in its early history
was fortunate in having argue constitutional questions before
it such legal giants as William Pinkney, Daniel Webster, Alex-
ander Hamilton, Luther Martin, William Wirt, and Joseph Hop-
kinson, and throughout the entire course of our constitutional
history the Supreme Bench has more or less had the benefit of
the help of the greatest lawyers in the United States. To men-
tion only a few, there have been Rufus Choate Joseph H. Choate,
William M. Evarts, Jeremiah Black, John F. Dillon, Elihu Root,
John W. Davis, and Charles Evans Hughes. These men have
not only helped the court to come to the right decisions and to
write exhalted opinions, but they and lawyers generally
throughout the United States have loyally supported the courts.
The inferior federal courts and the appellate jurisdiction of the
United States Supreme Court were estdblished by Congress. 153
Should the Supreme Court be supreme? At different times
many prominent United States statesmen have criticized and
attacked the Supreme Court for its making and exercising the
doctrine of its own supremacy. As already noted, the Supreme
Court was thus attacked in our early history by President Jef-
ferson and in our later history by President Roosevelt and Sena-
tor La Follette. Were these criticisms and attacks well
founded?
N,3 Beveridge, Life of Marshall, Vol. IV, 220-339.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
As we have seen, there must be someone under our form of
government to exercise supreme power. So far as the doctrines
of sovereignty of the people, the amendability of the Constitu-
tion, separation of powers, dual form of government, and the
supremacy of the Supreme Court are concerned, our Constitu-
tion and our form of government would cease to exist, if the
Supreme Court did not have the supremacy which it has as-
sumed. The state courts could not be entrusted with this power
because of the danger of their destroying our dual form of
government. The executive of the United States could not be
entrusted with this power because of the danger of his destroy-
ing the doctrine of the separation of powers. Neither Con-
gress nor state legislatures could be entrusted with this power
because of the danger of the destruction of all of the doctrines.
For the reasons heretofore given, the Supreme Court is the one
tribunal which can with the greatest safety be entrusted with
the power of supremacy. It is true that in exercising this
power the Supreme Court has gradually changed the balance
between the state governments and the federal government so
that the federal government now exercises many more powers
comparatively than it did in the beginning of our history. But
these changes have come about gradually and only as progress
and social interest have required them and the main doctrine
of a dual form of government still stands as it probably would
not have stood if it had not been for the Supreme Court. It is
true also that our doctrine of sovereignty of the people and the
amendability of the Constitution have been clarified and per-
haps enlarged by the Supreme Court, but it cannot be contended
that they have been destroyed. The Supreme Court has been a
faithful bulwark for both of these doctrines. It is true that
the doctrine of separataion of powers has gone through a great
many changes and development under the egis of the Supreme
Court. This development has proceeded so far that it seems
at first as though the doctrine had been entirely broken down.
It has become a doctrine of confusion of powers, but the confu-
sion has been caused by the Supreme Court no more than by the
original founders of the Constitution who started the work of
confusion. In spite of all the confusion, under the regime of
the Supreme Court, the three different branches of government
have continued to exist, and each one has continued to exercise
certain definite powers even though such powers have not been
those which appropriately belong to it. This is a very different
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result than would have followed if any other branch of the fed-
eral or state governments had exercised the powers which the
Supreme Court has been exercising. There is no disputing the
fact that the Supreme Court has upheld the doctrine of its own
supremacy. This is probably no more than any other depart-
ment would have done if it had been supreme. Enough has been
said to vindicate the doctrine of the supremacy of the Supreme
Court so far as these five doctrines are concerned.
So far as concerns the other doctrines of constitutional law,
that is, the doctrine of universal citizenship and suffrage and
the doctrine that many forms of personal liberty must be pro-
tected against social control, other considerations enter. Prob-
ably there would not have been so much danger of the overthrow
of these doctrines by other branches of government as there
would have been of the first five discussed. Yet even here with
the exception of the protection of personal liberty as a matter
of substantive law by the due process clause, probably the work
of the Supreme Court has been superior to what that of any
other branch of government would have been. It is true that
the Supreme Court has not always protected personal liberty as
many think it ought to have done. It has failed to protect the
privilege against self-crimination against third degree work. It
has failed, especially in war time, to give that protection to
freedom of speech and the press and peaceable assemblage that
perhaps ought to have been given. Perhaps some criticism
could be made of its work in connection with other constitu-
tional guaranties. Yet, on the whole, it must be admitted that
the Supreme Court has been a guardian of personal liberty. It
has also, of course, been a guardian of social control. On the
whole, this has meant that it has tried to exercise as wise a
judgment as it could in drawing the line between personal lib-
erty and social control.
So far as concerns the protection of personal liberty against
social control as a matter of substance under the due process
clause it is harder to evaluate the work of the Supreme Court.
This is a power which the Supreme Court has been exercising
for only thirty or forty years. It did not have this power until
it read this principle of constitutional law, as another judge-
made principle, into our United States Constitution. Our Con-
stitution and our form of government would not have been de-
stroyed if the Supreme Court had never done this, as they prob-
ably would not have been destroyed if the Supreme Court had
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not exercised its supremacy over either the doctrine of uni-
versal citizenship and suffrage or the doctrine of protection of
personal liberty against social control. Many think that when
it comes to questions of economic interests and social interests
in general that the greater number of representatives of the
people chosen at frequent intervals who sit in the halls of legis-
lation can better be trusted than the few representatives ap-
pointed for life who sit upon the Supreme Court. Apparently
President Roosevelt and Senator La Follette did not confine
their attacks upon the Supreme Court to this proposition. If
they had done so there would have been a great deal more to
their contention. Their apparent proposition to take the power
away from the Supreme Court to declare legislation unconstitu-
tional if in violation, of other doctrines of constitutional law,
like the separation of powers, dual form of government, etc.,
was utter nonsense. To have done any such thing as that would
only have resulted in the overthrow of our form of government,
and given us a parliamentary centralized form of government,
or some other form of government as different from our pres-
ent form of government. Perhaps such a form of government
would be as good or better than our own, but the writer for
one desires a while longer to try the experiment of our kind of
government. But none of these things are true so far as con-
cerns the protection of personal liberty by due process of law
as a matter of substance. However, even here the writer is not
so sure that the plan of having the Supreme Court rather than
any other branch of government exercise this power would not
work well, if the one other principle was introduced of a volun-
tary limitation of the Supreme Court upon itself that in a case
of this sort it would not set aside legislation except by at least
a 7 to 2 vote. the Supreme Court has already, theoretically at
least, put a voluntary limitation upon itself that it will not set
aside legislation except when its constitutionality is clear. How
can it be said that any act of Congress or of a state legisla-
ture upon a matter of police power, or taxation, or eminent do-
main is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt, when the
Supreme Court itself divides upon the subject by a 5 to 4 vote,
-and pehaps the four justices voting "no" are the most learned
members of the Bench? If the vote were 7 to 2, or 8 to 1, or
unanimous it might be a different matter. The whole matter of
determining whether the exercise of police power or the power
of taxation or the power of eminent domain is constitutional
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depends upon the question of reasonableness. It would seem to
be very unreasonable to set aside a solemn act of legislation
upon any of these subjects after the legislative body has come
to the conclusion that it is reasonable by such a narrow margin
as a majority of 5 to 4. If the Supreme Court would put on
itself the voluntary limitation herein referred to, practically
all the criticisms of the Supreme Court in its exercise of its
powers under the doctrine of its own supremacy would stop.
This limitation is one which the Court must put upon itself. If
Congress, as has been suggested by Senator Borah and some
others, should undertake to accomplish this reform by means of
an act of Congress it would seem to have no further effect than
to give the Supreme Court another act of Congress to declare
unconstitutional.
This article has undertaken to show the meaning of the doc-
trine of the supremacy of the Supreme Court, to trace its origin
to give the reasons for its existence, to show the results of its
operation, to give the reasons for its success and to point out
any places where it ought to be changed. Probably the great-
est result of such study is the gradual and continuing growth,
or emergence, of the Supreme Court as one of the greatest insti-
tutions in the American theory of government. After such a
study, it becomes apparent that not only the people and pros-
perity but the very existence of the Union is placed in its hands.
Without the active cooperation of justices of the Supreme Court,
the constitution would be a dead-letter. They protect alike their
own powers, executive powers, and legislative powers against
encroachments and designs of the other departments. Tey de-
fend the Union against the exuberant aspirations of the states
and the states against the exaggerated claims of the Union.
They protect the public interests against the interests of private
individuals and the interests of private individuals against the
public interest. They conserve the spirit of order against the
innovations of excited democracy. They maintain the power
of the people as against the ambitions of any of their agents.
The Supreme Court more than any other branch of the govern-
ment stands for the whole country and is truly "of the people,
by the people, and for the people."
It does not have the positive power over the purse or the
sword, or any other powers which could actually overthrow our
government, but the negative power of declaring the law-which
has kept our whole mighty fabric of government from rushing
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to destruction. The Court has not been infallible. It has made
mistakes. It sometimes has run counter to the deliberate and
better judgment of the community. But the final judgment of
the American people will unquestionably be that their consti-
tutional rights are safe in the hands of the federal judiciary.
Throughout the whole history of the United States, it furnishes
the highest example of adequate results of any branch of our
government. It has averted many a storm which was threaten-
ing our peace and has lent its powerful aid in uniting the whole
country in the bonds of justice. To paraphrase the language
of William Wirt, "if the judiciary were struck from our system"
there would be little of value that would remain. The govern-
ment cannot exist without it. "It would be as rational to talk
of a solar system without a sun" as to talk of a government in
the United States without the doctrine of the supremacy of
the Supreme Court.
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